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INTRODUCfiON 
After the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole came 
down, 1 a number of commentators wrote reassuringly to their 
distressed colleagues (and probably themselves) to the effect 
that the legal community should not make too much of the 
Court's holding. For example, Henry Monaghan concluded that, 
"[i]n the end, Seminole Tribe simply perpetuates a questionable 
line of reasoning, the negative effects of which may in any event 
be circumvented. State sovereign immunity remains the excep-
tion, not the rule, the rhetoric of state sovereignty notwithstand-
ing. "2 In a similar vein, Daniel Meltzer completed his assess-
ment with the suggestion that 
there remain reasons to think that the decision in Seminole is 
not one of a mounting series of blows to the reach of national 
power, but rather a gesture in the direction of a diffuse con-
ception of state sovereignty that in the end will not be gener-
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I. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding unconstitu-
tional the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") because, when acting under Article 
I, Congress does not possess the constitutional power to abrogate a state's immunity 
from suit in federal court) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). 
2. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 Harv. L. 
Rev. 102, 133 (1996). 
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ally enforced by the Court. If that is so, the Seminole decision 
may come to be seen not only as regrettable but also as quix-
otic.3 
In short, these scholars and others were inclined to view Semi-
nole as a symbolic, stake-in-the-ground sort of decision that 
lacked significant generative power. 
Looking back now, as the Court's 2000-2001 term has drawn 
to a close, hindsight suggests that these commentators may have 
seriously underestimated the extent of the conservative major-
ity's commitment to articulating its vision of state sovereign im-
munity. It is now abundantly clear that the Court in Seminole 
said what it meant, and subsequent decisions have shown that 
Seminole means what it says. 4 
Nevertheless, these commentators may have been right all 
along, but for reasons they did not even remotely recognize. 
This is because it does not necessarily follow from the fact that 
the Court "really means it" when it comes to state sovereign 
immunity that what the Court has to say on the issue really mat-
3. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 S. 
Ct. Rev. 1, 65 (footnote omitted). 
4. The Court's post-Seminole state sovereign immunity decisions are Idaho v. 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment 
precluded prospective relief against state officers who were interfering with plaintiff 
tribe's alleged property rights in submerged lands because tribe's suit was functional 
equivalent of quiet title action against state, which would prevent exercise of state regula-
tory authority over lands); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding provisions of Patent and Plant Variety Pro-
tection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 abrogating states' sovereign immunity uncon-
stitutional as beyond Congress' powers under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Col-
lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) 
(holding provisions of Trademark Remedy Clarification Act abrogating states' sovereign 
immunity unconstitutional as beyond Congress' powers under Section 5); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending Seminole's holding to suits commenced in state courts); 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Section 5 would not sus-
tain effort by Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity with regard to suits under 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA'')); and Bd. of Trustees of the 
Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1994 ("ADA") docs not constitute valid enforcement legislation under Sec-
tion 5, and thus does not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit). 
Also relevant to the issue of state sovereign immunity because they address the 
scope of Congress' powers under Section 5 are City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (holding unconstitutional Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 
which sought to overrule the Court's interpretation of Free Exercise Oause, because 
Congress' power under Section 5 extends to creation of remedies, not to alteration of 
substantive rights); and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Con-
gress was without power under either Commerce Clause or Section 5 to enact provision 
of Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("V AW A'') creating federal civil remedy for 
victims of gender-motivated violence). 
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ters. Enter Daniel Farber. Shortly after Seminole came down, 
he argued in a highly enjoyable and thought-provoking piece5 
that on an economic approach to the question of state sovereign 
immunity, "the Eleventh Amendment doesn't matter"6 insofar 
as "transaction costs don't prevent contracting around legal 
rules."7 "[M]ore precisely," Farber wrote, Congress and the 
states "will always bargain their way to an economically efficient 
outcome, regardless of the legal rule. "8 This, Farber maintained, 
"is a straightforward consequence of the Coase Theorem. "9 
Given the number of important recent Supreme Court decisions 
that trace their lineage to Seminole, 10 it is worth inquiring 
whether Farber is right, 11 and more importantly, determining ex-
actly what he is right about. As will be demonstrated, this latter 
5. Fallon, Meltzer, and Shapiro refer to Farber's essay as "a delightful, tongue-in-
cheek appraisal of Seminole in terms of economic costs and benefits." Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, 1999 Supplement 10 Hart and Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 108 (Foundation Press, 4th cd. 1996). Regardless 
of whether Farber intended his article to be "tongue-in-cheek" (and it is not at all obvi-
ous that he did), the important point to bear in mind within the context of this inquiry is 
that his analysis of the Court's engagement with the issue of state sovereign immunity 
broadly exemplifies what economic approaches to this constitutional question will neces-
sarily look like. On any self-respecting economic analysis, efficiency is the only relevant 
value, and transaction costs broadly conceived, see note 12, arc a very important obstacle 
to the realization of that value. This article is ultimately more concerned to engage the 
general economic approach to the issue of state sovereign immunity than Farber's per-
sonal views. See note 37. 
6. Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 Canst. 
Comm. 141, 142 (1996). 
7. ld. 
8. Id. The relevant legal rule in the context of state sovereign immunity is either 
congressional-abrogation-power or no-congressional-abrogation-power. 
9. ld. at 141. The Coase Theorem states that when transaction costs are zero, so 
that there are no impediments to bargaining, an efficient allocation of resources will re-
sult regardless of the legal rule that formally governs the situation. As Farber puts the 
point of the theorem, "Bargaining washes away legal rules .... " !d. at 142. See R.H. 
Coasc, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960); sec also Robert D. Cooter, 
The Strategic Constitution 53 (Princeton U. Press, 2000). Note that subsequent commen-
tators-not Coase himself-formulated Coase's conclusions as the Coase Theorem. See 
Robert D. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1982). 
10. See note 4. 
II. Of course, the fact of Farber's being right as a matter of economic theory is ir-
relevant as a matter of constitutional reality insofar as transaction costs are non-trivial 
and thereby impede bargaining between Congress and the states. Farber is well aware of 
this; indeed, he dedicates the bulk of his analysis to examining the effects of transaction 
costs under alternative assumptions about Congress' and the states' relative preferences 
for abrogating and retaining the latter's immunity from suit, respectively. Farber, 13 
Canst. Comm. at 142-43 (cited in note 6). This article does not consider the effects of 
positive transaction costs because its purpose is to demonstrate that even under the most 
charitable empirical assumptions concerning the presence of transaction costs, an exclu-
sively economic approach to the constitutional question of state sovereign immunity is of 
very limited value. 
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issue focuses attention on the constitutional crux of the matter-
namely, the extent to which an economic-efficiency approach to 
the question of state sovereign immunity ought to influence-let 
alone be dispositive of-its resolution. 
I. OF EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTION 
There is no doubt that Farber's application of Coase's as-
sumption and conclusion to the issue of state sovereign immu-
nity is valid as a matter of economic theory: If transaction costs 
are zero, so that nothing ever gets in the way of Congress and 
the states successfully bargaining over the latter's susceptibility 
to suit,12 then it certainly does not matter from the standpoint of 
efficiency whether or not Congress has the power to abrogate 
the states' immunity. If this assumption holds up, then as those 
enamored of economic analysis like to say, "the law doesn't mat-
ter." 
Putting aside the realism of the critical Coasian assumption 
regarding transaction costs, 13 what this typically imperialistic 
economic conclusion14 leaves out is the what with respect to 
which the law does not matter-namely, economic efficiency. 15 
It also leaves out the what with respect to which the law always 
matters, even when transaction costs are zero-namely, distribu-
tive consequences. That is, even though Congress and the states 
will always be able to bargain to a social welfare-maximizing 
outcome regardless of whether Seminole or Union Gas 16 is the 
law of the land insofar as transaction costs are zero, which deci-
sion is on the books makes a great deal of difference in terms of 
12. Note that Coase expanded the idea of transaction costs to encompass all im-
pediments to successful bargaining. See Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 53 (cited in 
note 9). Costless bargaining does not necessarily imply successful bargaining because of 
the possibility that strategic behavior (i.e., "hard bargaining" tactics) will prevent the par-
ties from being able to agree on how to divide the value created by the bargain (called 
the cooperative surplus, see note 20). See generally Cooter, The Cost of Coase (cited in 
note 9). 
13. See note 11. 
14. See note 39. 
15. There are a number of conceptions of efficiency in economics. The most basic 
is Pareto efficiency. An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if the 
only way to make one person better off is to make another person worse off. Thus, 
Pareto optimality does not allow losses. In contrast, cost-benefit efficiency identifies the 
efficient outcome as the one that maximizes the sum of net benefits (i.e., benefits less 
costs) accruing to all people affected by the allocation regardless of their distribution 
across those people. Thus, the cost-benefit standard allows losses insofar as the winners 
win more than the losers lose. This article uses the cost-benefit standard in discussing the 
distributional consequences of different constitutional rules of state sovereign immunity. 
16. See note 1. 
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the relative costs that Congress and the states have to bear, and 
thus their relative political and economic power. 
The following example demonstrates the point nicely. Sup-
pose that in enacting particular legislation, Congress would be 
willing to pay $10 million to render the state of California sus-
ceptible to suit in federal court for its violations of that statute. 17 
Suppose further that California is opposed to being vulnerable 
to such suits, and would be willing to pay $5 million for a sub-
stantive immunity. 18 The cost-benefit efficient solution in this 
17. The example that follows assumes that Congress can, consistent with the Con-
stitution, in effect purchase waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity from the states-
for example, by using its Article I spending power to condition the states' receipt of fed-
eral funds on their waiving sovereign immunity. The precedent most on point concerning 
this congressional option is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The Court's hold-
ing that Congress may condition some percentage of federal highway funds on a recipient 
state's adopting a minimum drinking age is significant in light of the fact that it relied on 
the assumption that the Twenty-first Amendment would bar Congress from enacting a 
national minimum drinking age. Given that the Twenty-first Amendment limits congres-
sional action that would otherwise fall within the commerce power, it closely resembles 
the Rehnquist Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in this respect. This 
close legal correspondence provides a strong argument in favor of the constitutionality of 
Congress' using its spending power to exact waivers of immunity from the states. 
On the other hand, Dole intimated in dictum that there were limits on Congress' use 
of the spending power, stating that "our cases have suggested (without significant elabo-
ration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the 
federal interest in particular national projects or programs."' Id. at 207 (quoting Massa-
chusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). The Court could 
seize this notion as a way of limiting aggressive congressional use of the spending power 
to circumvent the limits imposed by Seminole and its progeny. 
Additionally, what in Dole was characterized as a condition or temptation could 
readily be perceived as coercion in many statutory contexts. This is significant in light of 
the fact that the conservative majority has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to 
revisit established constitutional doctrines in pursuit of its determination to articulate 
and preserve a robust doctrine of state sovereign immunity. In this regard, Fallon, Melt-
zer, and Shapiro ask: "Given the majority's apparent willingness to chip away at other 
established constitutional doctrines in order to protect its vision of untrammeled state 
sovereign immunity ... , is the broad authority recognized in Dole to condition financial 
grants on state waiver a technique that may be narrowed or eliminated?" Fallon, Melt-
zer, and Shapiro, 1999 Supplement at 111 (cited in note 5). It may not be unduly pessi-
mistic-but rather simply realistic-to conclude that the answer to this question is are-
sounding "yes." 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the example in the text is to illustrate the point that the 
law always imparts distributional consequences, even when economic efficiency can be 
achieved regardless of the legal rule that formally governs the situation. The extent to 
which Congress may constitutionally purchase waivers of immunity from the states is not 
under consideration here. 
18. This example employs the standard economic technique of measuring a party's 
valuation of a state of affairs in terms of its willingness to pay to bring it about or prevent 
it from obtaining. While the assumption that value equals willingness to pay is ethically 
and empirically questionable-and indeed can be morally outrageous-when a signifi-
cant percentage of a person's wealth is at stake, it is not problematic within the context of 
the example in the text since it concerns bargaining between two governments with only 
a few million dollars at stake. 
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case is for California to be susceptible to suit in federal court for 
violations of the statute, since the benefit to Congress of $10 mil-
lion exceeds the cost to California of $5 million, resulting in a net 
social benefit of $5 million. Assuming no transaction costs, this 
outcome will be achieved regardless of the controlling constitu-
tional law of state sovereign immunity: Under Union Gas, Con-
gress would have the power to abrogate California's immunity 
without paying a cent, and under Seminole, Congress could pay 
California a sufficient amount for it to voluntarily waive its im-
munity-for example, $7.5 million. Either way, the efficient out-
come obtains, so that as far as efficiency is concerned, "the Elev-
enth Amendment doesn't matter." 19 
Nevertheless, the distributive consequences associated with 
the alternative legal regimes under examination are far from ir-
relevant. Under Union Gas, Congress ends up with a benefit of 
$10 million and California incurs a cost of $5 million. Under 
Seminole, Congress obtains a net benefit of $2.5 million (a $10 
million benefit from California's waiver less the purchase price 
of $7.5 million), and California nets $2.5 million (receipt of a 
$7.5 million payment less the $5 million cost of waiver). Thus, 
although the law does not matter from the aggregate standpoint 
of efficiency, it matters a whole lot to each of these competing 
sovereigns. Congress would much rather end up ahead $10 mil-
lion than ahead only $2.5 million, and California certainly would 
rather gain $2.5 million than lose $5 million.20 
Now, an obvious question comes to mind. In terms of the 
values that are most deeply implicated in debates over federal-
ism in general and state sovereign immunity in particular/1 what 
19. See Farber, 13 Const. Comm. at 142 (cited in note 6). 
20. This numerical example can be formalized using cooperative bargaining theory. 
See Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 56-57 (cited in note 9). A party's threat value 
(TV) indicates how well it can do in the absence of cooperation (i.e., successful bargain-
ing). The noncooperative value of the game (NV) is the sum of the parties' threat values. 
The cooperative value of the game (CV) is the sum of the payoffs the parties receive 
when they cooperate by bargaining successfully. The cooperative surplus (CS), which is 
the amount of value created through cooperation, is the difference between the coopera-
tive value and the noncooperative value of the game (i.e., CS = CV- NV). 
Under Union Gas, TV """"'u = 10 and TV"'"'~= -5, so that NV= 5 and CV = 0, which 
in turn implies that CS = -5. In essence, bargaining cannot possibly succeed here because 
cooperation cannot create value. This is because Congress wants to abrogate California's 
immunity more than California is opposed to it, and Congress has the legal authonty to 
do so. 
The situation is different under Seminole. TV"""""'= 0 and TV c.1•~g = 0, so that NV 
= 0. CV = 5, which implies that CS = 5. Here, cooperation creates value because Con-
gress is willing to pay more for the waiver than California requires to ~rant it, and Cali-
fornia has the legal right to refuse to do so. Thus, Congress can try to mduce Cahforn1a 
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matters more as a matter of constitutional law: Maximizing the 
sum of the welfares of Congress and California regardless of how 
that value is distributed between them (as required for cost-
benefit efficiency),22 or deciding how the costs and benefits of al-
ternative legal and political decisions will be distributed between 
these competing sovereigns? About which alternative are de-
fenders of states' rights and advocates of one national constitu-
tional community more concerned? Certainly these questions 
answer themselves. Thus, Farber's assertion that "the Eleventh 
Amendment may well be irrelevant,"23 like the more general 
Coasian claim that "the law doesn't matter," contains much 
more rhetorical flare than substantive bite. It is like saying that 
the rules of baseball "don't matter" because, assuming it is al-
ways warm and sunny on game day, the rule that informs the 
umpire's discretion with respect to postponing a game on ac-
count of inclement weather never comes into play. Certainly, 
nice weather matters to all fans and players of America's pas-
time. But the rules of the game primarily exist to serve more 
important purposes. 
II. THE PLACE OF EFFICIENCY IN THE PANTHEON 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
The fight within the Court over state sovereign immunity 
constitutes a prominent battlefield in a larger war being fought 
over the constitutional question of state sovereignty in general. 
That is, the Justices are steeped in an ideological conflict over 
to waive its immunity by paying a sufficient price. 
A positive cooperative surplus usually indicates that successful bargaining is possi-
ble. It is not assured, however, because the parties still need to agree on how to divide 
the surplus. Bargaining theory predicts that the price of waiver witt fall somewhere in the 
interval between $5 million (the minimum California is willing to accept) and $10 million 
(the maximum Congress is willing to pay). Nevertheless, as Cooter writes, "Economists 
have long struggled with the fact that self-interested rationality alone does not determine 
the distribution of the cooperative surplus. Social norms help close the gap. A reason-
able solution to the bargaining problem often gives each player his threat value plus an 
equal share of the cooperative surplus." !d. at 57. Because John Nash was the first to 
formalize the properties of this solution, game theorists call it the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950). 
In the numerical example under consideration, Cooter's simplified version of the 
Nash bargaining solution suggests that Congress should receive TV c"''"n + 1h(CS), or 0 + 
Yz(S) = $2.5 million. California should receive TV c.'""""+ Yz(CS), or 0 + Yz(S) = $2.5 mil-
lion. Thus Congress, should pay California $7.5 million. 
21. For a discussion of some of these values, see Part II. 
22. Sec note 15. 
23. See Farber, 13 Const. Comm. at 141 (cited in note 6). 
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federalism. 24 Part of what is required for a viable long-term 
resolution of this debate is "a functional analysis of the role of 
the states in the federal system. "25 Among the values in play are 
24. That the fight within the Court is really about federalism is evident from con-
sideration of the consistency of the recent state sovereign immunity decisions, see note 4, 
with the Court's holdings in other major federalism cases-in particular, United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (sec note 4); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(holding that Congress may not "commandeer" local sheriffs by requiring them to per-
form background checks on would-be handgun purchasers in conformity with provisions 
of Brady Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down for first time 
since New Deal a federal statute regulating private conduct-possession of a gun in a 
school zone-as beyond Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce); and New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that federal statute requiring states to 
either regulate radioactive waste or take title to waste constitutes compulsion and com-
mandeering of governmental capacity of state governments, not encouragement, and 
therefore is beyond Congress' regulatory power). As Vicki Jackson concludes: 
... Seminole Tribe must be regarded as part of a broader canvass on which the 
Court is redrawing lines of federalism .... 
These recent federalism decisions [i.e., Seminole, Lopez, and New York] 
are united by the diminished (in some cases invisible) role of Garcia v. San An-
tonio Metropolitan Transit Authority [469 U.S. 528 (1985)] and its view that the 
interests of the states can largely be safeguarded through the structures of fed-
eralism themselves. In New York and Seminole Tribe, the record of state par-
ticipation in resolving an ongoing problem at a national level through legislation 
to which states as such significantly contributed is clear. There can be little 
doubt that the "safeguards of the federal structure" were in play there, if they 
ever can be said to be in play. That the Court largely ignored the relevance of 
these safeguards suggests that the influence of Garcia is, at best, waning. 
Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Eviscera-
tion of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 495,541-42 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Deci-
sions subsequent to Seminole have confirmed Jackson's assessment of the current situa-
tion. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653-54 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, 11., dissenting); sec also id. at 661-64 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
That the fight within the Court is really about federalism and not sovereign immu-
nity per se is also evident from the fact that neither the members of the conservative ma-
jority nor the dissenters have found it relevant to discuss at any length the sovereign im-
munity of the United States in their state sovereign immunity opinions. This is very 
telling, for if it were the Justices' diverging views on sovereign immunity that constituted 
the crux of the doctrinal dispute, certainly they would find it both useful and necessary to 
analogize or distinguish the sovereign immunity of the United States in their Eleventh 
Amendment opinions. 
25. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Fed-
eralism after Garcia, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 341, 345. Rapaczynski's analysis focuses on the 
Garcia-context. What a functional approach to federalism questions leaves out in the 
context of state sovereign immunity is the great extent to which this issue is laden with 
symbolic meaning for people on both sides. The strong reactions that the Court's recent 
Eleventh Amendment decisions typically engender in members of the legal community 
tend to overstate and thus obfuscate how much is really at stake from a day-to-day, in-
strumental standpoint in this area of the law. The crux of the legal question to which 
these decisions speak is the susceptibility of states to suits for retrospective federal relief 
in actions brought by private parties, since prospective relief against state officers re-
mains available under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that federal court 
could enjoin state attorney general from enforcing in state court an unconstitutional state 
rate-setting order for railroads), general concerns about the future implications of Semi-
nole and Coeur d'Alene on this front notwithstanding. See note 4. While it is certainly 
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(1) preserving liberty through tyranny prevention; (2) providing 
a space for participatory politics; and (3) articulating legal stan-
dards and moral/cultural values in such areas of community life 
as education, antidiscrimination norms, and criminal law en-
forcement.26 
It is beyond the scope of this short article to theorize the 
trade-off among these values. Rather, what is directly relevant 
not the case that this question is of trivial significance in the constitutional scheme of 
things, it nevertheless is of considerably less importance than many others which the 
Court typically addresses, including, for example, that decided in Lopez, see note 24, 
which spoke to the scope of Congress' general power to regulate. 
Perhaps the reason that the strength of lawyers', judges', and academics' sentiments 
about the issue of state sovereign immunity is out of proportion to its practical signifi-
cance lies in the perceived symbolic significance of subjecting states to suits brought by 
private citizens. That is, this particular theatre of battle in the larger war being fought 
within the Court over federalism is laden with symbolic meaning for people who feel very 
strongly about this more general structural issue. 
In this light, it is worth considering Ninth Circuit Judge William Fletcher's observa-
tion that Seminole is 
at least a partial mistake from the viewpoint of the five Justices in the major-
ity ... [because] an argument in favor of state sovereign immunity is powerful 
when a state performs its sovereign functions, especially its policing and other 
criminal justice functions. But this argument has little or no force when a state 
engages in commercial activities .... [R]egulation under the Commerce, Pat-
ent, and Copyright Clauses generally does not regulate a state in the perform-
ance of its sovereign functions .... [L]egislation passed under these clauses is 
virtually always directed at private actors, and brings a state within its scope 
only because the state engages in the same behavior as the private actors . 
. . . If the Court really believes that the distinction [between sovereign ac-
tions and commercial actions] is unimportant, we need to rethink a number of 
important legal ideas. Perhaps most obvious, those Justices in the current ma-
jority who voted for National League of Cities v. Usery need to rethink their ra-
tionale in that case ... , for the holding in National League of Cities depends on 
the distinction between activities of a state that involve its sovereignty and ac-
tivities that do not. ... [F]urther, if the commercial activities of the states are 
the activities of sovereigns, the Court needs to rethink the market participant 
doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause, under which a state is allowed 
to favor its own residents only when it is engaged in commercial activities. 
William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 843, 853-55 (2000) (footnotes omitted). While Fletcher's analysis has much force as 
a practical matter, it is doubtful that the members of the conservative majority are un-
aware of the doctrinal tension-if not flat inconsistency-he points out, and it is even 
more doubtful that they will be much moved by his argument. The reason probably 
comes down to a significant consideration he neglects to entertain-namely, the symbolic 
significance of state sovereign immunity for the Justices in the majority. That is, in their 
minds and as they would put it, the "indignity" of "hailing" a "sovereign State" into court 
at the "behest" of a private citizen far exceeds any symbolic damage to a state's sover-
eignty that results from the Court's Commerce Clause or dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, the distinction between sovereign actions and commercial actions notwith-
standing. 
26. There is much debate over whether the states are valuable as laboratories of 
experimentation. Compare Rapaczynski, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. at 408-18 (cited in note 25), 
with the Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
523, 523-26 (2001 ). 
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to the present inquiry is the idea that collectively they carry 
much greater constitutional weight than economic efficiency, 
and they are often in serious tension with it. As Rapaczynski 
observes: 
[W]hat seems doubtful is that governmental efficiency is 
among the primary functions of our constitutional division of 
authority between the states and the federal government. 
Quite to the contrary, if my analyses of the role to be played 
by the states in protecting the citizens from the dangers of 
governmental oppression and in providing a public space for 
participatory politics are correct, then the protection of these 
constitutional functions of the states requires that a certain 
price be paid for them in terms of a degree of governmental 
. ff' . 27 me ICiency. 
Rapaczynski's analysis addresses the first two values served by 
federalism identified above. Concerning whether the locus of 
cultural values in the areas of education, the family, antidis-
crimination, and criminal law should be national or local, which 
accounts for the Lopez and Morrison majority's concern with 
traditional subjects of state regulation,28 a consequentialist eco-
nomic analysis only gets off the ground insofar as We the Peo-
ple29 are prepared to choose national or local solutions exclu-
27. Id.at413. 
28. Sec Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government pre-
sents ... , it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as 
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign."); 
sec also Morrison, 529 U.S. 615-16: 
Given these findings and petitioners' arguments, the concern that we expressed 
in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Oause to completely obliter-
ate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems 
well founded. See Lopez, supra, at 564 .... The reasoning that petitioners ad-
vance seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of vio-
lent crime (the suppression of which has always been the prime object of the 
States' police power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If 
accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as 
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects 
on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may 
regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any 
other type of violence since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all violent 
crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which it 
is a part. Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating 
violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family 
law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of 
marriage, divorce, and childbearing on the national economy is undoubtedly 
significant. 
29. The words "We the People" in the text refers to the authority of the United 
States Constitution as ethos, as an instantiation of national identity. See Robert C. Post, 
Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 35-38, 41-49 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1995) (articulating the constitutional authority of ethos). Post writes that "the te-
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sively on the basis of aggregate consequences. Insofar as We 
have preferences for the national or local levels ex ante (i.e., an-
tecedent to a global consequentialist analysis), economics cannot 
tell us anything. To put the point another way, an economic ap-
proach to federalism would decide what We should want in light 
of the overall costs and benefits associated with the various al-
ternatives. The Supreme Court's participation in the perpetual 
process of collective identity formation, in which the practice of 
constitutional adjudication is most fundamentally engaged, more 
often first decides who We were, are, and aspire to be-and thus 
want for ourselves and our posterity- before determining the 
relevant aggregate costs and benefits. 
This is as it should be. Similar to the values that underlie 
the other two main prongs of the American constitutional struc-
ture (i.e., the separation of powers and individual rights), those 
served by federalism transcend and are in some tension with the 
value of efficiency. There would thus be some truth to meeting 
the grandiose claim that "the law doesn't matter" with the dis-
missive response that when it comes to constitutional law, "eco-
nomics doesn't matter." But this would be to overstate the 
point. The fact of the matter is that economics is relevant: The 
economists are appropriately at the table at which constitutional 
debate unfolds. The practice of constitutional adjudication must 
"take[ ] consequences seriously"30 not only because in extreme 
situations, the Constitution is not a "suicide pact,"31 but also be-
cause in the more mundane context of everyday life, one of the 
explicit purposes of the Constitution is to "promote the general 
Welfare. "32 
Nevertheless, economic analysis is of much greater potential 
value in the public-law context for its positive analyses than for 
its prescriptive arguments. For example, the contribution of 
Farber's piece lies in its rigorous investigation of the effects of 
transaction costs on political bargaining between Congress and 
the states,33 especially its identification of the potentially per-
verse consequence that "some states will in the end be harmed 
los and shape of constitutional interpretation ... demands ... a continual effort to articu-
late the authority of our 'fundamental nature as a people."' !d. at 36 (quoting Hanna 
Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 167, 169 (1987)). 
30. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 3 (cited in note 9). 
31. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (warn-
ing that the Court's decision may have moved far enough toward embracing civil liberties 
so as to have turned the Bill of Rights into a "suicide pact"). 
32. U.S. Const., Preamble. 
33. See Farber, 13 Const. Comm. at 142-43 (cited in note 6). 
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by Seminole because political inertia will prevent them from en-
tering into waiver bargains that actually would be in their inter-
ests. "34 By contrast, Farber's prescriptive claim that "the cor-
rectness of Seminole" turns "on a comparison of relative political 
transaction costs ... [,] not on the history or text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, "35 is worse than wrong. In sacrificing all of the 
other, ultimately more important constitutional values in play at 
the altar of economic efficiency, Farber's normative conclusion 
is dangerous because it tends to corrode the integrity of the prac-
tice of constitutional adjudication. Efficiency is only one of a 
number of purposes that the Constitution is intended to serve.36 
Moreover, in the pantheon of constitutional values, its pursuit is 
almost always of secondary-and thus nondecisive-
constitutional importance.37 
CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIRTUE 
OF HUMILITY 
It has not been the purpose of this brief article to flesh out 
how the constitutional federalism values of tyranny reduction, 
political participation, and collective identity formation, as well 
as symbolic considerations/8 play out in the context of state sov-
ereign immunity. Rather, what has been emphasized here is the 
judgment that some combination of them-not the results of an 
efficiency analysis-ought to be dispositive of its resolution. Al-
though economists are imperialists by nature,39 constitutional 
34. Id. at 142. 
35. Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted). 
36. The practice of constitutional adjudication is a messy intellectual exercise. 
Unlike economic analysis, constitutional law does not possess an analytical structure that 
focuses exclusively on maximally realizing one value. Instead, it is most fundamentally 
about identity and meaning-i.e., about how enactments of law come to stand for and 
ultimately to constitute a culture and a people. This being the case, constitutional law 
often will be engaged in the extremely difficult but profoundly necessary project of 
crudely balancing incommensurable values. What is lost in analytical rigor, theoretical 
parsimony, and aesthetic appeal is more than offset by the knowledge that the fundamen-
tal law is fulfilling its social function. 
37. As a prominent public-law scholar in addition to being an expert on law and 
public choice, Farber presumably knows this. Thus, he is careful to write that, 
"{a]ccording to standard law and economics reasoning, the Eleventh Amendment may 
well be irrelevant." ld. at 141 (emphasis added). Similarly, he observes that, "{f]rom a 
law and economics perspective, then, the correctness of Seminole seems to tum on a com-
parison of relative political transaction costs." ld. at 143 (emphasis added). Through 
these qualifications, Farber appears to be conveying that he is presenting an economic 
approach to the question of state sovereign immunity, not necessarily his own considered 
view of the issue. See note 5. 
38. See note 25. 
39. Consider the words of George Stigler, who won the Nobel Prize in Economic 
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law is a field within which they would be wise to proceed with 
extreme caution, genuine humility, and a profound appreciation 
of the limits of economic analysis. 
Science in 1982 for his seminal contributions to price theory, industrial organization, and 
the history of economic thought, his role in founding the sub-fields of the economics of 
information and the economics of regulation, and his pioneering research on the intersec-
tion of economics and the law. Sec Richard Schmalcnsee, George Stigler's Contributions 
to Economics, 85 Scand. J. Econ. 77 (1983). Stigler asserts that "economics is an imperial 
science: it has been aggressive in addressing central problems in a considerable number 
of neighboring social disciplines, and without any invitations .... [E]conomics (is] the 
study of all purposive human behavior." George J. Stigler, Economics- The Imperial 
Science? 86 Scand. J. Econ. 301,311 and 302 (1984). 
